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he European Commission has published its 
proposals  for  the  transfer  of  supervisory 
responsibilities to the European Central Bank 
(ECB),1 under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing 
a  comprehensive  and  courageous  ‘first  step’ 
towards a European banking Union, the other steps 
being  European  deposit  insurance  and  resolution 
procedures.  However,  on  a  number  of  issues  the 
Commission’s  chosen  path  raises  questions  that 
should  be  brought  out  in  the  open  and  fully 
recognized before final deliberation by the Council. 
                                                   
1 Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks 
on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating 
to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions, 
COM(2012)  511  final,  Brussels,  12.9.2012;  Proposal  for  a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010  establishing  a 
European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Banking 
Authority)  as  regards  its  interaction  with  Council 
Regulation (EU) No…/… conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  COM(2012) 
512 final, Brussels, 12.9.2012; and Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
A  Roadmap  towards  a  Banking  Union,  COM(2012)  510 
final, Brussels, 12.9.2012. 
Contents of banking union 
In a highly integrated financial system, such as in 
the  European  Union,  taming  moral  hazard  and 
excessive  risk-taking  requires  a  consistent  set  of 
regulatory incentives, based not only on common 
rules but also on integrated supranational powers 
in  banking  supervision,  deposit  insurance  and 
crisis management, including resolution. The three 
functions  are  intimately  interconnected,  and  only 
their  joint  management  can  eradicate  the 
expectation  of  national  bail-outs  from  the  system 
and  thus  establish  proper  incentives  against 
reckless  risk-taking  by  banks  in  the  internal 
market.2  The  Commission  proposal  covers  bank 
                                                   
2  Schoenmaker  &  Gros  (2012)  stress  that  a  system  with 
centralized  supervision  at  the  ECB  but  national  deposit 
insurance  and  resolution  arrangements  would  not  be 
‘incentive  compatible’  and  therefore  would  not  work: 
instead,  they  argue  that  a  centralization  of  all  three 
functions  is  necessary  to  establish  a  well-functioning 
banking  union.  Their  proposal  on  institutional 
arrangements  entails  the  creation  of  a  European  Deposit 
Insurance  and  Resolution  Authority  (EDIRA),  different 
from the ECB; our scheme, as will be discussed, is slightly 
different in that it places the ECB at the heart of the system 
for  the  exercise  of  all  powers  at  EU  level  (while  placing 
elsewhere  the  management  of  attendant  insurance  and 
resolution funds).  
T2 | CARMASSI, DI NOIA & MICOSSI 
 
supervision and part of crisis management but – by 
necessity,  in  view  of  the  scope  of  the  legal  basis 
provided by Article 127(6) – not deposit insurance 
and resolution.  
On  this,  the  Four  Presidents’  Road  Map3 
(henceforth  the  Road  Map)  speaks  of  “single 
European  banking  supervision  and  a  common 
deposit insurance and resolution framework” (see 
p.  4),  potentially  opening  the  way  to  a  different 
legal  regime  for  the  two  latter  domains.  Under 
previous  Commission  proposals  for  the 
harmonization of deposit insurance (as under their 
proposal  of  July  2010)4  and  resolution  (following 
their recent proposal of June 2012)5, these domains 
would  be  governed  by  harmonized  rules  but  the 
administration  of  the  systems  would  remain 
basically national (Carmassi et al. 2012). However, 
in  its  Communication  on  the  banking  union,  the 
Commission  has  announced  its  intention  to 
propose  to  establish  “a  single  resolution 
mechanism which would govern the resolution of 
banks and coordinate in particular the application 
of  resolution  tools  to  banks  within  the  banking 
union” (p. 9). 
As  to  deposit  insurance,  the  first  paramount 
requirement is that deposit insurance should only 
protect depositors and never be used to cover bank 
losses and shield bank managers, shareholders and 
creditors. Furthermore, deposit insurance must be 
centralized to provide not only equal incentives to 
bank  shareholders  and  managers  with  ex-ante 
funding and risk-based fees throughout the internal 
market, but also full risk pooling and an adequately 
funded insurance fund across the banking system 
at EU level, so as to be able to cushion large shocks 
affecting one of the largest cross-border banks.  
                                                   
3 European Council (2012), “Towards a genuine monetary 
and  economic  union”,  Report  by  the  Presidents  of  the 
European  Council,  the  European  Commission,  the 
Eurogroup  and  the  European  Central  Bank,  Brussels,  26 
June. 
4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  on  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  [recast], 
COM(2010)368 final, Brussels, 12.7.2010. 
5 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, 
Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010, COM(2012) 280/3, Brussels. 
The legal basis of the rules on deposit insurance, 
including  the  creation  of  a  European  deposit 
insurance fund and attendant fees, would remain 
that of Article 114 TFEU, and therefore be decided 
by  ordinary  legislative  procedure.  The 
accumulation  and  pooling  of  funds  would  only 
start  within  the  new  system,  and  thus  not  affect 
accumulated  insurance  funds,  in  line  with 
transitional  arrangements  proposed  by  Gros  & 
Schoenmaker (2012).  
There  is  a  question  of  where  to  place  the 
administration of the insurance fund. In our view, 
a  separate  section  of  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) could well perform this purely 
financial function, while all the supervisory actions 
relating  to  risk  assessment  and  other  controls  of 
insured entities should be brought under the ECB 
supervisory powers. As indicated in the Road Map, 
the  ESM  will  also  act  as  ‘fiscal  back-up’  to  the 
insurance fund, but this should be only in the case 
of a crisis affecting the entire banking system, and 
never  to  cover  losses  stemming  from  individual 
bank insolvency.  
As  to  crisis  management  powers,  they  must  be 
attributed  to  the  EU  level  in  order  to  establish  a 
credible  threat  that  bank  shareholders  and 
managers will be fully liable for the consequences 
of  imprudent  behaviour  and  will  under  no 
circumstances be bailed out by national authorities 
with taxpayers’ money, so as to fully eradicate from 
the  system  all  possibility  for  supervisory 
forbearance at national level. However, as we shall 
argue,  while  this  requires  strong  common 
resolution rules, it does not require all resolution 
powers to be moved to the EU level.  
An important matter to be decided here is where to 
place  the  borderline  between  supervisory 
corrective  action  and  resolution  proper.  On  this, 
the  Commission  proposal  (Article  4.1k)  includes, 
amongst  supervisory  powers  to  be  transferred  to 
the  ECB,  early  intervention  “including  recovery 
plans  and  intra-group  financial  support 
arrangements”, with the proviso that these powers 
will be exercised “in cooperation with the relevant 
resolution  authorities”.  It  would  be  preferable  in 
this regard, however, to be more explicit and bring 
under  the  supervisory  umbrella  of  the  ECB  all 
crisis-management  measures  that  do  not  involve 
winding  up  the  banks:  therefore  including  the 
power  to  order  the  suspension  of  dividends, 
recapitalization,  management  changes,  asset 
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of a ‘bad’ bank. If it was clarified that these powers 
belong to the exercise of supervision, then the need 
for the ECB to coordinate with national resolution 
authorities would vanish. With these powers in the 
hand of the ECB – as they are under the US FDIC 
system and in some EU member states – deterrence 
would  be  sufficiently  strong  and  supervisory 
forbearance at national level would be precluded.  
Were  this  to  be  the  chosen  approach,  resolution 
would  become  a  residual  function  that,  under 
common rules preventing national authorities from 
making  good  on  the  losses  incurred  by 
shareholders and creditors, may well be performed 
by  national  authorities  of  the  parent  company 
according  to  national  rules.  This  would  have  the 
advantage  of  removing  from  the  discussion 
questions of harmonization, let alone centralization, 
of bankruptcy rules.6 
This  approach  does  not  eliminate  the  need  for  a 
European  banking  resolution  fund.  Rather  than 
covering losses emerging from liquidation, its task 
should be to provide capital, in case of need, to the 
‘good bank’ carved out by (European) supervisors 
to preserve deposits, sound commercial loans and 
other  assets,  and  worthy  systemic  functions 
relating to the payment infrastructure (Carmassi et 
al., 2010). This approach was notably shared by a 
2010  Commission  Communication  on  resolution 
funds7 and therefore should be readily acceptable 
to  the  Commission.  In  view  of  its  limited  scope, 
such a fund would not have to be very large; its 
resources  could  be  raised  by  means  of  a  small 
surcharge  over  the  deposit  insurance  fee  and  be 
managed  by  the  ESM  together  with  the  deposit 
insurance fund. 8 
As  will  be  discussed  below,  the  centralization  of 
administrative powers does not require that they be 
always exercised at the central level for all banks 
                                                   
6 It must also be stressed that, were the resolution authority 
to be supranational, the creation of this new authority could 
not fall under Article 127(6) and would have to rely on a 
different  legal  basis,  and  attendant  powers  could  not  be 
entrusted to the ECB.  
7  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee  and  the  European  Central  Bank,  Bank 
Resolution Funds, COM(2010) 254 final, 26.5.2010, Brussels, 
p. 3. 
8 In order for the ESM to play the role we have envisaged 
on  deposit  insurance  and  resolution,  its  treaty  should be 
amended so as to allow it to perform these functions also 
for banks of non-euro countries. 
and  in  all  circumstances;  indeed,  a  ‘federal’ 
organization in the exercise of these powers seems 
desirable  and  even  necessary.  What  is  important, 
however,  is  that  the  legal  powers  of  supervisory 
decisions firmly reside at the supranational level, in 
this  closely  following  the  legal  set-up  of 
competition policy.  
Finally,  in  order  to  ensure  democratic 
accountability, the ECB “shall be accountable to the 
European Parliament and the Council” (Article 17 
of the Commission proposal) and will submit each 
year  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council and the Eurogroup on the execution of its 
supervisory  tasks.  This  solution  seems  adequate, 
mirroring as it does the provisions already applied 
for monetary policy.  
The scope of application of the regulation 
The Commission has taken the view – apparently 
shared  by  the  ECB  and  most  participants  in  the 
debate on banking union – whereby the decision to 
centralize supervisory powers at the ECB would in 
the main apply to eurozone members, while non-
euro  participants  could  join  the  common 
supervisory mechanism under a ‘close cooperation’ 
arrangement entailing reduced membership rights 
(e.g.  representation  in  the  Supervisory  Board  of 
Article  19  and  the  possibility  of  unilateral 
termination of the cooperation arrangement by the 
ECB under Article 6). This approach is not required 
by the Treaty and entails a risk of segmentation of 
the  internal  market  in  banking  and  financial 
services,  as  non-eurozone  members  of  the  Union 
could  become  lesser  participants  in  the  common 
supervisory  mechanisms,  to  the  extent  that  over 
time  the  ECB  came  to  develop  more  stringent 
supervisory  standards  not  accepted  by  non-euro 
countries.  
In this regard, it should be noted that Article 127(6) 
is not restricted to the eurozone and may therefore 
apply to all Union members – as made explicit by 
the transitional provisions of Article 139(2c) which 
mentions other provisions of Article 127 that do not 
apply  to  member  states  ‘in  derogation’  (i.e.  not 
using the euro), but not its paragraph 6. A similar 
provision  is  present  in  Protocol  15  (point  4) 
regarding  the  application  of  Article  127(6)  to  the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. A further 
specific  confirmation  is  provided  by  Council 
Regulation  n.  1096/2010  of  17  November  2010 
“conferring specific tasks upon the ECB concerning 
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Board”, which used Article 127(6) as the legal basis 
for  appointing  the  ECB  President  and  Vice-
President to the ESRB Board and charging the ECB 
with the specific tasks of setting up and funding the 
secretariat of the ESRB, which is a body comprising 
the  full  membership  of  the Union  and not  solely 
eurozone members.  
There is little doubt, more in general, that under the 
Treaty  the  ECB  is  a  Union  institution,  while  the 
restriction of its monetary functions only to certain 
member states is a ‘temporary’ situation permitted 
under a derogation from Treaty obligations. In this 
regard,  one  may  recall  that  the  Road  Map  had 
called  for  “an  integrated  financial  framework  … 
cover[ing]  all  EU  member  states,  whilst  allowing 
for specific differentiations between euro and non-
euro area member states” (p. 4).  
Indeed, one sees no reason why the new common 
rules on supervision should not apply to the entire 
Union membership, keeping into account that most 
arguments  requiring  banking  union  are  valid 
independently  of  whether  the  country  uses  the 
euro – the main exception being those relating to 
the  proper  functioning  of  the  monetary  policy 
transmission mechanism. 
Should  some  countries  decide  not  to  participate 
and threaten to exercise their veto power to block 
the decision, then it would perhaps be preferable to 
offer them an opt-out rather than to exclude from 
the start from banking union all member states not 
participating in the euro.  
The institutional set-up 
Three  questions  must  be  examined  here:  i)  the 
separation  of  monetary  and  micro-supervisory 
functions  within  the  ECB,  ii)  the  relationship 
between the ECB and EBA in the performance of 
supervisory  tasks  and  iii)  the  relationship  to  be 
established  with  existing  national  supervisory 
structures.  As  to  the  first  issue,  the  ECB  is  at 
present  responsible  for  carrying  the  monetary 
policy functions, defined by Article 127(2) of TFEU, 
and in addition, its President chairs the European 
Systemic  Risk  Board,9  which  is  responsible  for 
macro-prudential stability and for which the ECB 
also  provides  a  secretariat.  This  supervisory 
function in reality is little more than a return to the 
traditional scope of monetary policy in caring for 
                                                   
9 Significantly, the ESRB also has a Vice-Chair from a non-
eurozone country. 
aggregate  financial  stability,  a  role  that  had  been 
somewhat  overshadowed  by  the  sole  emphasis 
placed  on  price  stability  in  the  definition  of 
monetary policy goals.  
Micro-supervision, the subject of the Commission’s 
proposal,  is  an  entirely  different  matter  since 
concern for individual banks’ safety and soundness 
may  at  times  come  into  conflict  with  monetary 
policy goals (Goodhart & Schoenmaker 1995). The 
obvious example is when a central bank presiding 
over  an  undercapitalized  and  generally  weak 
banking  system  may  be  reluctant  to  tighten 
monetary  policy  for  fear  of  pushing  some  of  the 
banks under its supervision over the brink. Thus, 
the effective separation within the ECB of the new 
micro-supervisory  powers  from  macro-monetary 
policy-making is of paramount importance in order 
to preserve the integrity of both functions. 
In this regard, the Commission proposal does not 
go far enough, in that the new function is set up as 
an  internal  function  of  the  ECB,  exercised  with 
delegated powers from the Governing Council  of 
the  ECB  and  under  its  “oversight  and 
responsibility”  (Article  19.3  of  the  Commission 
proposal).  Under  such  a set-up,  separation seems 
hardly  guaranteed  and  there  is  a  high  risk  of 
contamination between the two functions.  
An  alternative  to  be  considered  is  the  creation 
within  the  ECB  of  a  separate  and  independent 
Governing  Council  responsible  for  bank 
supervision,  mimicking  the  structure  of  the  ECB 
Governing  Council,  and  therefore  comprising  an 
Executive Board (of nine members) and the heads 
of  national  supervisory  structures.  The  Executive 
Board  would  include  six  members  appointed  by 
the EU Council following the same procedure as for 
the ECB Executive Board, and in addition the Vice-
President of the ECB, the chairs of EBA and ESM - 
which is the common fund in charge of  financial 
assistance to the member states and, in our scheme, 
the  management  of  deposit  insurance  and 
resolution funds. In this manner, there would be an 
institutionalized connection, but no subordination, 
within the ECB, of the monetary policy and bank 
supervision  functions.  The  Commission  could 
attend  the  meetings  of  the  Governing  Council  as 
observer, as in the Commission proposal. The ECB 
Vice-President would chair the Executive Board of 
the  new  supervisor  and  would  report  to  the 
Governing Council of the ECB – thus ensuring full 
and effective mutual flow of information – and the 
EU  Council  and  Parliament  on  the  execution  of BANKING UNION: A FEDERAL MODEL FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION | 5 
 
supervisory  tasks.10  But  the  Governing  Council 
responsible  for  supervision  would  not  receive 
instructions from the Governing Council handling 
monetary policy.  
As envisaged by the Commission Communication 
– but perhaps not fully yet reflected in legislative 
texts – the EBA would remain in charge of ensuring 
not  only  a  single  rule  book,  but  also  uniform 
supervisory practices (the ‘hand book’). This latter 
task  will  be  of  paramount  importance  for 
preserving the integrity of the internal market even 
with reference to jurisdictions that were to opt out 
of  centralization  of  supervisory  powers  with  the 
ECB. In any event, once it is accepted that the new 
supervisory arrangements apply in principle to the 
whole Union, full and effective coordination with 
EBA would be better guaranteed by the presence of 
its  chairman  as  a  full  voting  member  in  the 
Executive Board of the ECB Supervisory Board; in 
this manner, the EBA would partake in overseeing 
and enforcing the uniform application of common 
banking rules.  
The  third  aspect  that  must  be  modified  in  the 
Commission  proposal  concerns  the  relationship 
between the Union and the national supervisory 
structures.  Under  the  Commission  proposal,  the 
ECB  would  acquire  “exclusive  competences”  in 
carrying out the tasks listed in Article 4.1, and build 
up  a  new  administrative  structure  for  its  fully 
centralized  exercise.  Quite  differently,  the  Road 
Map  had  envisaged  the  creation  of  “a  single 
supervision system with a European and a national 
level.  The  European  level  would  have  ultimate 
responsibility … and would be given supervisory 
authority  and  pre-emptive  intervention  powers 
applicable  to  all  banks.  Its  direct  involvement 
would vary depending on the size and nature of 
banks.”  
An  alternative  institutional  set-up  to  the 
Commission proposal, and one more in tune with 
the Road Map, is offered by the network model for 
the enforcement of EU anti-trust law (Articles 101 
and  102  TFEU)  contained  in  Council  Regulation 
1/2003. Under that model, the centralized enforcer 
(the  Commission)  and  national  authorities  have 
parallel competence to apply EU rules in individual 
cases;  the  allocation  of  cases  is  governed  by 
                                                   
10 The choice of the ECB Vice-President would facilitate the 
splitting,  within  the  ECB,  of  responsibility  and 
communication  for  monetary  policy  and  supervision,  in 
line with Lannoo (2012, p. 4).  
guidelines set out by the EU level; information on 
individual proceedings flows systematically within 
the  network  of  competition  authorities;  and  the 
European authority may advocate any case in order 
to  ensure  the  consistent  operation  of  the  system. 
The beauty of this system is that cases are almost 
automatically  handled  at  the  right  level,  thereby 
avoiding any unnecessary centralization of powers 
or duplication of structures, in full accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
There would be two great benefits in adopting such 
a  ‘network’  model  for  supervision.  First,  national 
supervisory structures would be fully incorporated 
into the new supranational system, thus allowing 
full exploitation of their expertise and knowledge 
of national banking structures. Second, the need for 
fresh human and financial resources to manage the 
new  supervisory  tasks  of  the  Union  would  be 
minimized,  and  the  national  and  Union  levels 
would work in a strictly complementary manner. 
A point that deserves specific consideration in this 
context  concerns  the  role  of  Colleges  of 
Supervisors of cross-border banking groups. These 
would  be  supervised  on  a  consolidated  basis,  as 
already  envisaged  in  the  Commission  proposal 
(Article  4.1i).  In  the  Commission  proposal,  these 
bodies  would  disappear  for  banks  concentrating 
their  activities  solely  in  the  eurozone,  but  would 
remain to manage home and host relations between 
euro and non-euro jurisdictions. In our approach, 
the Colleges would survive in all cases and become 
an  executive  arm  of  the  ECB  for  all  cross-border 
Union banks.  
Despite  some  improvements,  for  the  time  being 
these bodies are weak instruments in the hands of 
the  parent  company  national  supervisors  and 
provide  for  limited  exchange  of  information 
between the home- and host-country supervisors of 
the group. The establishment of Union supervision 
offers  the  opportunity  to  turn  them  into  effective 
supranational supervisory structures, acting under 
instructions by the ECB, with full powers to control 
and inspect all branches and subsidiaries of cross-
border  banking  groups  –  thus  getting  rid  of  the 
current artificial task allocation between home- and 
host-country control while at the same time making 
full  use  of  existing  supervisory  structures.  The 
Colleges  would  deliver  their  supervisory  reports, 
including any proposal for remedial action, to the 
ECB Supervisory Board, which would deliberate on 
the report’s conclusions and recommendations, and 
entrust  the  Colleges  for  their  implementation.6 | CARMASSI, DI NOIA & MICOSSI 
 
The institutional set-up that has been proposed is 
diagrammed in the figure below.  
 
 





The  financial  crisis  highlighted,  among  many 
regulator  failures,  a  widespread  tendency  by 
national  regulators and supervisors  to side  with 
their  troubled  banks  in  hiding  information  from 
the  public,  delaying  loss  recognition  and 
postponing  corrective  action,  thus  magnifying 
eventual  losses  (Calomiris  &  Herring  2011, 
Carmassi & Micossi 2012). When the crisis struck, 
it has not been unusual for national regulators to 
cover  losses  in  opaque  manners  to  protect  not 
only  creditors  but  also  shareholders  and 
management. Transferring supervisory powers to 
the  Union  level  should  go  most  of  the  way  in 
removing  supervisory  forbearance  from  the 
system;  however,  the  system  would  be 
strengthened  further  by  the  adoption  of  Prompt 
Corrective Action as under the US Federal Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  system,  which 
entails stronger incentives for supervisors to act in 
the  general  interest  of  depositors  and  investors 
and to eschew capture by regulated entities.11  
                                                   
11 Benston & Kaufman (1997). 
Two  features  of  the  system  are  worth  stressing. 
The  first  one  is  reliance  on  public  indicators  of 
bank  capital  weakness  to  signal  the  need  for 
corrective action, based on a set of preannounced 
thresholds  corresponding  to  remedial  actions  of 
increasing  intensity.  The second  is an  obligation 
for  supervisors  to  act  when  the  thresholds  are 
crossed:  in  other  words,  supervisory  action  is 
mandatory.12 
Adoption of such a system was discussed by the 
Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  but 
never agreed upon, not surprisingly with constant 
opposition  by  national  supervisors  in  European 
countries  who  wanted  free  hands  in  managing 
banking crises. Now that the failures of the system 
have  been  exposed,  including  rampant 
forbearance  by  national  supervisors,  the  time 
should be ripe to move to a US-type system.  
Thus,  there  should  be  a  system  of  capital 
thresholds  requiring  supervisors  to  act  with 
                                                   
12 More precisely, some actions are mandatory and others 
are  left  to  the  discretion  of supervisors;  see Table  10 in 
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remedial  measures  of  increasing  intensity  as  the 
specific  thresholds  are  trespassed;  however,  the 
precise  application  of  instruments  within  each 
‘capital zone’ should involve some discretion by 
supervisors,  who  would  have  to  motivate  their 
decisions.  Or,  more  flexibly,  the  system  could 
entail  a  presumption,  rather  than  a  rigid 
obligation, to act and apply measures appropriate 
to  each  capital  zone,  with  full  public 
accountability of the specific choices made.  
As for the capital indicators, the FDIC has referred 
to  a  combination  of  risk-weighted  and 
unweighted  capital  ratios.  However, 
overwhelming new evidence has shown that risk-
weighted capital ratios are not reliable indicators 
of weakening capital and risk positions of banks 
requiring  enhanced  supervisory  action.  Straight 
(unweighted) leverage ratios, on the other hand, 
seem to provide consistent forecasts of emerging 
trouble sufficiently in advance for supervisors to 
intervene in a timely fashion (Haldane, 2012). One 
additional  finding  by  this  literature  is  that  in 
building  these  ratios,  and  attendant  capital 
thresholds triggering supervisory action, reference 
should  be  made  to  the  evolution  of  the  market 
value  of  equity  relative  to  book  value  (see  also 
Calomiris & Herring 2011). Of course, building a 
reliable  system  of  thresholds  will  require 
extensive  empirical  work  to  properly  calibrate 
relevant capital indicators and capital zones; this 
is  a  work  that  the  ECB  and  EBA  may  well 
undertake after the decision is made to move to 
the new system of prompt corrective action.  
In conclusion 
The  European  Commission  has  prepared  a 
courageous  and  comprehensive  proposal  for  the 
centralization  within  the  ECB  of  supervisory 
powers, in the context of a banking union that will 
also  comprise  deposit  insurance  and  resolution. 
The  proposal  would  be  greatly  strengthened  by 
enlarging  its  scope  of  application  to  the  entire 
Union,  rather  than  an  undetermined  eurozone-
plus  Union  membership.  EBA  should  remain  in 
charge of all secondary rule-making in the domain 
of banking, including supervisory standards, and 
to this end its chair should be included in the new 
supervision Executive Board. Finally, supervisory 
standards  should  be  broadened  to  include  all 
crisis  management  powers  under  a  prompt 
corrective action system à-la-FDIC. Our blueprint 
for  the  governance  of  banking  union  under  this 
approach is depicted in our figure.  
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